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Abstract 
Empirical research on the impact and determinants of group lending is by now 
substantial. However, very little is known about the possible role of collateral to 
mitigate incentive problems in group lending. This is because microcredit programs 
have normally been implemented in rural areas of developing countries. Indeed, the 
reason for this choice is lack of credit access since agents with collateral are very 
rare. Also, to the extent that rural communities have tight-knit hierarchical structures 
information about borrowers is accessible and the enforcement of sanctions via 
social networks makes collateral superfluous for default mitigation. Yet, in an urban 
setting in which information is more atomized and social sanctions are not as 
powerful, collateral may have an important role in group lending. First, we illustrate 
in a model the role of collateral to mitigate group default. Second, we use data from 
a group lending program implemented in 2001 in Cotonou, the largest city in Benin 
with more than one million inhabitants. We empirically explore the risk profile of 
individual borrowers and resulting group heterogeneity to identify the role of 
personal contributions to investment projects. Our evidence suggests that while 
diversification within groups facilitates risk pooling, it also increases expected bailout 
or group default costs for low risk borrowers. Collateral helps offset and alleviate 
potential negative spillovers from group default induced by membership of 
borrowers with risky projects. The presence of borrowers with collateral facilitates 
access to credit for group members without collateral, who in turn provide insurance 
against group default. We find joint liability to be a mechanism for risk sharing in a 
setting where poor households lack resources for collateral and insurance markets 
are missing. 
Keywords: Group lending, mutual cosigners, collateral, risk sharing, strategic 
default, bailout costs. 
JEL Codes: O12, O17, G20, D82 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years microfinance has transformed from being an experimental 
alternative to formal and informal sources of credit to being a model for 
lending programs to the poor and a development tool for poverty alleviation. 
Microfinance has allowed credit to the poor beyond the traditional financial 
frontiers insofar as lack of collateralizable assets has been overcome by 
group lending in tight-knit communities. Social cohesion giving rise to 
norms and sanctions to deter default has provided a form of social collateral 
in group lending situations. Also, knowledge transmission via social 
networks reduces information asymmetry within communities. Hence, in 
small villages with high poverty rates and limited availability of resources for 
collateral, social capital has become a catalyst for the successful 
implementation of joint liability credit programs. In order to expand the 
traditional financial frontiers, microfinance has developed tailored financial 
services based on a set of incentives for borrowers to repay their loans and 
for lenders to provide innovative financial products. The result has been 
high repayment rates that guarantee the long-term sustainability of financial 
organizations. 
The successful performance of microfinance institutions has been 
extensively debated, especially in terms of the methods of credit delivery. In 
particular, group lending receives most of the interest in research and in 
practice. The key feature of this contractual method is shared liability making 
the entire group responsible for the loans given to individual borrowers. 
First, group lending mitigates information asymmetry. Joint liability, inducing 
borrowers to carefully self-select choose their groups, can provide a solution 
to adverse selection faced by lending institutions (Ghatak, 1999; van Tassel, 
1999; Armendariz and Gollier, 2000) At the same time peer monitoring 
mitigates moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1990; Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994; 
Armendariz, 1999; Wydick, 1999 and 2001). Second, group lending facilitates 
enforcement of penalties on defaulters when borrowers have close ties 
(Besley and Coate, 1995; Wydick, 1996). The potential role of collateral has 
been absent from the discussion in the group lending literature by an large. A 
notable exception is Prescott and Townsend (2002) who model coalitions 
pooling resources of agents with perfect information about each other, 
allowing for individual resource heterogeneity. Part of the reason is that joint 
liability schemes have been designed precisely to overcome credit 
inaccessibility when agents lack collateral resources. In particular, group 
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lending has been most intensively deployed in rural areas in developing 
countries where lack of assets is generalized. By delegating borrower 
selection and monitoring to other group members, financial intermediaries 
can attain profitable repayment rates even without collateral. Group 
members belonging to the same social networks have at their disposal a 
larger set of punishment instruments for default than remote financial 
intermediaries. 
Most of the theoretical models are based on the paradigm that credit groups 
will form among members of equal risk leading to the hypothesis of 
homogeneous matching. The first argument is due to partner selection 
inducing borrowers in joint liability agreements to select peers to minimize 
the expected costs of either bailing out other group members or costly group 
default. This implies that the safest borrowers will only accept other group 
members with similar risk profiles. At the same time, the riskiest borrowers 
can only group with partners of similar levels of risk. Therefore, there will be 
homogeneous matching in equilibrium, or at least assortative matching, 
where any risk heterogeneity is due to the unavailability of partners of the 
same type or matching frictions in the group formation process affecting 
borrowers' ability to find their preferred partner (Armendariz, 1999). The 
second line of argument focuses on adjustments in project selection as 
borrowers in a group will encourage their partners into investments no 
riskier than their own, or will leave risky groups, resulting in an equilibrium 
with group members of the same risk (Stiglitz, 1990). 
These models generally imply that group homogeneity is optimal. This is 
partly due to the assumption of uncorrelated investment returns ruling out 
benefits from risk pooling. Loic Sadoulet (2000) has pointed out that while 
the tolerable degree group heterogeneity depends on the borrowers' outside 
option, in the absence of insurance markets heterogeneity may be a risk 
diversification vehicle. It is conjectured that transfers between group 
members can make coalitions between low and high risk investors stable. 
Intra-group insurance is modelled by Wydick (2001) in a dynamic context as 
sustainable given that loss of future credit to defaulters is sufficiently costly. 
In the present paper, we consider joint liability agreements as vehicles for 
risk sharing, with collateral as the mechanism that makes heterogenous 
groups sustainable. When some but not all agents have collateral, we argue 
that group lending may be relevant not only to provide credit to agents 
without collateral but also to provide insurance to agents with collateral. This 
can be especially relevant to borrowers in urban of developing countries, 
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where social sanctions are limited but interaction between households with 
and without collateral resources is feasible. 
Empirical research on microcredit has mainly concentrated on group 
formation and peer monitoring. The role of collateral in joint liability 
agreements has not empirically explored yet. In the past, it has been 
suggested that transfers or side payments could sustain heterogenous groups 
in what effectively amounts to high risk members purchasing insurance from 
low risk ones. However, there no evidence provided that such transfers take 
place. In this paper, we test whether the presence of collateral facilitates 
mutual insurance in group formation. Our empirical results show that 
heterogenous groups emerge in which members with high risk investment 
projects mitigate default prospects through collateral. This shows that joint 
liability is conducive to insurance provision as long as there is a mechanism 
for high risk investors in the group to commit agains strategic default and 
compensate low risk investor members. 
Attanasio and Davis (1996) have shown that even in the US, where 
contingent security markets are far more advanced than in any developing 
country, the joint cross-sectional distribution of household earnings and 
consumption is inconsistent with insurance against earnings risk implied by 
the Arrow-Debreu paradigm. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) show 
that idiosyncratic earnings shocks realized during the working life of 
household members are sufficiently large and persistent to account for more 
than half of the cross sectional variation in earnings in the US. Indeed 
household earnings shocks have the same degree of persistence as business 
cycles shocks, but their volatility dwarfs that of cyclical fluctuations. Income 
risk is especially important in developing countries as a large share of 
households live close to the subsistence income threshold. It is essential to 
enhance the scope for consumption smoothing and to understand ways in 
which risk can be shared across households. The analysis in this paper 
suggests that the use of group lending in urban areas of developing countries 
may be one such way. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
related literature. Section 3 presents a benchmark model to illustrate the role 
of collateral fro risk sharing in group lending. Section 4 provides a 
description of the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy and 
implications of our results. Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
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 2 Related Literature 
 
In developing countries, lending institutions possess limited information on 
the type and behavior of their clients. However, group lending can enhance 
the financial intermediaries' ability to screen and monitor their borrowers. 
Microfinance institutions are designed to overcome asymmetric information 
in the relationship between bank and borrower, by transferring the screening 
and monitoring functions at the community level to jointly liable borrowers. 
Reporting the advantages of collective actions in screening and monitoring 
with respect to distant bank agents, Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) 
emphasize that group members have easy access to information on the 
reputation, creditworthiness and efforts of their peer borrowers thus 
facilitating enforcement of loan repayment . However, the repayment 
performance of group lending under joint liability may be undermined 
because of the risk sharing in case of default. In fact, a member may, 
intentionally, choose an excessively risky project counting on the other 
members to repay. Therefore, if borrowers have perfect information about 
each other type, will self-select homogeneously with respect to investment 
risk (Stiglitz 1990; Devereux and Fisher 1993; Ghatak, 1999). Given this 
selection mechanism, Ghatak (2000) shows how lenders can exploit the 
degree of joint liability to screen between borrowers of different type. Safe 
borrowers prefer a higher degree of joint liability and a lower interest rate, 
risky borrowers a lower degree of joint liability and a higher interest rate. 
However, since the lender does not know borrower type and collateral are 
not available, it has to offer the same interest rate to all borrowers. As a 
consequence, safe borrowers are driven out of the credit market (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, risky borrowers with unproductive projects 
may be cross-subsidized by safe borrowers with productive project (De 
Meza and Webb, 1987). Starting from the last consideration, safe borrowers, 
trough joint liability, are attracted back in the credit market and risky 
borrowers are pushed away. Therefore, joint liability is seen as an instrument 
to exploit local information to alleviate credit market failures and to improve 
the economic efficiency. The notion that joint liability induces borrowers to 
group with partners with the same risk profile is challenged by Sadoulet 
(2000) who suggests that, in a context of missing insurance markets, 
homogeneity is not necessarily optimal. If the group fails, it will lose access 
to future credit. Insurance arrangements could compensate the safe 
borrowers for covering for the risky ones in cases of need, such as risk-
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premia transfers from the riskier to the safer member. Heterogeneity, 
defined by the literature as a second-best outcome, can become the first-
best. Wydick (2001) develops a framework with dynamic incentives to derive 
the possibility of intra-group insurance. In contrast to the independence of 
project returns assumed by the authors mentioned until now, Laffont (2003) 
considers exogenously fixed potential pairs of ex ante identical entrepreneurs 
who carry projects with correlated returns and have limited liability. The 
model incorporates the problem of collusion leading to strategic group 
default. He describes optimal lending contracts in the class of individually 
incentive compatible, when the bank deals with adverse selection problems. 
Group lending contracts are guided by the revelation mechanism which do 
not rely on the ex post observability of investment project returns but on 
private information only. When collusion occurs and information is 
complete, group lending contracts are shown to be optimal. 
Another argument for homogeneity focuses on the benefits of group lending 
ex post to group formation: the costs of monitoring a peer decrease if she 
undertakes the same trade (Devereux and Fisher, 1993) and when there are 
social ties group lending can improve repayment rates and relax credit 
rationing (Floro and Yotopolous, 1991). Group lending may also reduce the 
incentive for moral hazard relative to individual lending if the threat of social 
penalties is sufficiently high in the case of borrower default (Besley and 
Coate, 1995). Other models emphasize the potential benefits of peer 
monitoring and intra-group credit insurance. Stiglitz (1990), Conning (1999) 
and Armendariz (1999) show how peer monitoring among borrowing groups 
members reduce the incentive for risk-taking. Moreover, Varian (1990) and 
Rashid and Townsend (1992) explain the role of insurance among group 
members when negative stochastic shocks occur, if borrowers project 
returns are not highly correlated. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, 
Prescott and Townsend (2002) allow for collateral when groups of agents 
informed about each other pool resources. Such arrangements are shown to 
be optimal in the presence of sufficient heterogeneity among agents, 
including inequality. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, Prescott and 
Townsend (2002) allow for collateral when groups of agents informed about 
each other pool resources. Such arrangements are shown to be optimal in 
the presence of sufficient heterogeneity among agents, including inequality. 
Empirical studies explore either the issue of group formation or the 
occurrence of peer monitoring. Wydick (1999, 2001) analyzes data from a 
microcredit program in Guatemala, comprising 139 groups in 1994, finding 
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evidence of risk sharing with group expulsions as the discipline device 
against defaults. Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001), analyzing a 1995 microcredit 
program with 450 groups in Guatemala, provide empirical evidence of the 
existence of both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups with respect to 
risk at the same time. To explain this simultaneity, they argue that group 
formation is endogenous and the risk taken by each borrower is jointly 
determined by her choice of partner. Heterogeneity is the result of the 
welfare-maximizing actions of the members of the group. Group lending 
leads to heterogeneous groups to the extent that riskier members pay a 
premium in good states of nature to safer borrowers. By allowing transfers 
between members, heterogeneous formation of the group is a Pareto 
improvement over homogeneous formation. Only individuals who are too 
risky will not find safe borrowers willing to match with them and, therefore 
highly risky borrowers will form separate homogeneous groups. Lensik and 
Mehrteab (2003) conduct a survey in 2001 among group members and group 
leaders of borrowers who accessed to loans from two microcredit programs 
in Eritrea. Their main results strongly indicate that groups are formed 
heterogeneously. Most importantly, they do not find support for the 
matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even if they control for 
matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist of 
borrowers of the similar risk type. De Weeerdt (2001) on the basis of 
household and network data collected in a Haya village in Tanzania, finds 
that kinship, geographical proximity, the number of common friends, clan 
membership, religious affiliation and wealth strongly determine network 
formation. Insights in endogenous network formation are used to assess 
vulnerability of households, distinguishing between those likely to experience 
network shocks and those who are not. The results reveal that there are weak 
networks that collapse under shocks and strong networks that can cope with 
these shocks. The latter is likely if households tend to link up with others of 
similar wealth, occupation and place of residence. 
As far as monitoring is concerned, Hermes, Lensik and Teki (2001), dealing 
with data coming from participants of 102 groups in Eritrea, provide an 
empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties on moral 
hazard behaviors. Regular contacts and short distance between the group 
leader and group member reduce moral hazard behavior of group members 
and minimize misuse of loans. Also, Karlan (2003), analyzing FINCA Peru 
data, argues that monitoring costs are reduced when individuals live closer to 
each other. Cultural heterogeneity and geographic dispersion matter greatly 
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to the effectiveness of peer monitoring and enforcement of lending 
contracts. Peer lending is more effective if individuals who live closer and are 
more alike culturally are grouped together. This notion that social capital is a 
catalyst to financial intermediation is explored by Guiso et al. (2002) where 
regional variation in trust across regions in Italy is found to impinge on the 
management of personal finances. Finally, Ahlin and Townsend (2003) use 
heterogeneity in repayment rates among groups to find determinants of the 
success of joint liability arrangements. They find that in the poorest region of 
Thailand the role of social sanctions emphasized by Besley and Coate (1995) 
and Wydick (1996) seems crucial. None of these empirical papers 
contemplate any form of collateral substitute, apart for joint liability. 
 
 
3 Risk Sharing and Group Default with Collateral:  
A Theoretical Framework 
 
The model presented below to illustrate how the presence of collateral 
affects incentives under joint liability is based on Besley and Coate (1995). 
We adapt their model of the role of group sanctions facilitating the build up 
of social collateral to enhance group lending to a situation in which sanctions 
among group members are limited to the repossession of assets. First, we 
discuss the case of individual borrowing as a benchmark. Then, we analyze 
the case of joint liability. After that we compare the performance of 
individual and group lending. Finally, we characterize the role of collateral in 
mitigating strategic default and facilitation mutual insurance in the context of 
joint liability. 
 
 
 3.1 Individual Lending  
 
A risk neutral borrower has a project, requiring one unit of capital, that lasts 
for one period and yields  θ   units of income. The project return is known 
when the project has been realized. Ex ante it is common knowledge that  θ   
is distributed on  θ , θ    according to the distribution function  Fθ   that 
has the properties of being continuous on  θ , θ    and satisfying  
Fθ  = 0  . 
 9 
At the end of the period, the borrower decides whether to reimburse the 
loan by paying  r > 1,   including both principal and interest, or to default. 
In the latter case, the bank inflicts sanctions on the defaulting borrower, 
represented by the continuous and increasing penalty function  pθ  . The 
penalty function represents the loss to the borrower due to seizure of profits 
from the project by the lender, and it increases with the project return.2 
Evaluating the cost of repayment,  r   , and the penalty in case of default,  
pθ  , the borrower chooses to repay if and only if  r ≤ pθ.   We let the 
critical project return at which the borrower is indifferent between 
repayment and default by  θ = φr  , where  φ⋅ ≡ p−1⋅   is defined as 
the inverse of the penalty function  p⋅  . Since  p⋅   is increasing in the 
project return, the loan will be repaid if and only if the project return is 
greater than the critical project return. This implies the probability of 
repayment is be given by  ΠIr = 1 − Fφr,   with  Fθ  = 0  . The 
probability of repayment is decreasing in  r  , insofar  φr   is increasing. 
We assume  φ1 > θ  , so that from the bank's perspective, it not possible 
to obtain repayment for every project return. Therefore, there are possible 
profit realizations such that the borrower may decide not to pay the loan 
even if it were interest free (i.e.  r = 1  . The default rate is, in fact, positive 
for all positive interest rates, i.e. for all  r > 1  . 
 
 
3.2 Group Lending 
 
We assume the group to be composed of two ex ante identical borrowers, 
borrower 1 and borrower 2 running two independent projects whose 
                                                 
2
The loss could also have nonmonetary elements such as pestering by debt collectors or loss 
of face due to public announcements. Also, another way to specify the penalty function would 
be to consider a repeated game in which the lender implements a trigger strategy of shutting 
down future access to credit. This would be a less costly way for the lender to penalize 
defaulters. However, it would require the introduction of incremental credit needs by 
borrowers, for the loss of credit access to be sufficiently costly. 
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returns,  θ1   and  θ2  , are common knowledge once realized. They get a 
loan of two units of capital at the beginning of the period and are jointly 
liable to repay  2r   , the loan principal plus interest rate, at the end of the 
period. The repayment decision is an all or nothing decision, hence the 
group either repays  2r   or does not repay. To contrast deliquent borrowers 
the lender applies the penalties  pθ1    and  pθ2   . 
The repayment game is articulated in two stages. Both the borrowers 
simultaneously take the decision of contributing their share,  r   , or not at 
the first stage of the game. If they contribute, the loan is repaid and their 
payoffs are  θ1 − r,θ2 − r  . Whereas, if they do not contribute, then the 
loan is not repaid and the lender imposes penalties:  
θ1 − pθ1 ,θ2 − pθ2   . However, if one of the borrowers has decided 
not to contribute, at the second stage of the game the other borrower has to 
decide whether or not to repay the whole loan herself. In this case, if the 
loan is repaid by borrower 1, the payoff is  θ1 − 2r,θ2   . If borrower 1, 
like borrower 2, instead decides to take default alternative, the payoffs are  
θ1 − pθ1 ,θ2 − pθ2   
 From borrower 2's point of view, the former option has the advantage that 
she does not face the lender sanctions. We now characterize the project 
return vectors  θ1 ,θ2    for which there is group loan repayment. 
Proposition 1:  If  θ i > φ2r   for either  1=i   or 2, there is repayment. If  
φr < θ i ≤ φ2r   for both  1=i    and 2, the loan may be repaid. Otherwise, i.e.  
φr > θ i   for either  1=i   or 2, there will be group default. The repayment rate  
under group lending is:  { }[ ] ( )[ ]22 ()2(()2((1)( rFrFrFrG φφφ −+−=Π      
Proof: See appendix.     
Now, we want to compare repayment rate under group lending with that 
obtained under individual lending: 
 
{ }[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]
[ ] ( )[ ] ))(()())2(())2((1))((
))((1)())2(()2((1)()( 22
rFrFrFrFrF
rFrFrFrFrr IG
φφφφφ
φφφφ
−−−=
−−−+−=Π−Π
 
 
This expression captures the trade-off faced by lenders who are considering 
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the adoption of group lending to improve repayment rates. The first term 
represents the mutual insurance effect. It is the probability that one 
borrower will have a return above  φ2r  , when the other has a return 
below  φr  . A return below  φr  , when the individual lending scheme is 
adopted, would lead to insolvency and default. In contrast, in group lending, 
trough the joint liability instrument, the much more fortunate borrower, i.e. 
with a return above  φ2r,   will also repay the share of the less fortunate 
borrower, effectively providing insurance against the lender penalty. 
The second term represents the negative spillover from individual default 
under joint liability. It is the probability that one borrower has a return 
between  φr   and  φ2r   while the other has a return below  φr  . In 
the individual lending scheme the borrower with a return between  φr   
and  φ2r   would repay. However, under joint liability, this otherwise 
solvent borrower would default because the burden of repaying the whole 
group loan by herself exceeds the default penalty. In this case, there is a 
negative drag down effect from the group member with the unprofitable 
project as her default imposes a burden on the other member, as well as on 
the lender as the whole group loan is defaulted. There is group default, even 
though one group member would have repaid if she had not been faced with 
liability for her partner's share. When one of the partner's project fails, there 
is negative spillover on the other group member who although is capable to 
cover her individual liability may opt to default rather than paying the loan of 
the other group member. 
 
 
3.3 Collateral 
 
The above framework assumed no costs to a borrower from not 
contributing her share of the group loan, except for the penalties to 
individual members imposed by the bank in the event of group default. 
Here, we consider what happens in the case of group lending when we allow 
for the possibility of asset repossession, where an individual's assets can be 
expropriated by a group lending partner. We demonstrate how the existence 
of collateral can improve the performance of group lending. 
In village economies, with tight knit communities, the imposition of 
sanctions through hierarchical social networks can provide a mechanism to 
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enforce joint liability agreements and in many developing countries, this is 
the most appropriate context in which to analyze group lending. The role of 
social norms to induce repayment under joint liability is incorporated in the 
literature (e.g. Besley and Coate, 1995; and Wydick, 1996) and, in particular, 
it has been shown how the lack of collateral induced by widespread poverty, 
which makes credit inaccessible, can be overcome if social cohesion can be 
harnessed to mitigate strategic default in group lending. 
We consider group lending performance in a different environment in which 
(i) social sanctions have limited impact and (ii) some borrowers possess 
resources for collateral. These conditions can prevail in urban contexts in 
developing countries where communities are atomized relative to rural 
communities. Also, in cities it is possible for poor individuals to interact with 
better off individuals and potentially form a group under a joint liability 
agreement. In general, the role of collateral in the analysis of group lending 
has been ignored because microcredit arrangements were precisely a 
response to grant credit to those without access to formal credit. Hence, the 
benchmark has been a situation in which resources for collateral are lacking. 
We complement existing analyses by allowing for collateral in order to 
motivate our empirical analysis of group lending in an urban environment, as 
described in the next section. While it might seem superfluous to grant 
microcredit to individuals who have resources for collateral, we show that 
they can draw in group members who would otherwise have no access to 
credit. Hence, the provision of microfinance to individuals who also have 
access to formal credit does not necessarily lower welfare as has been argued 
before (e.g. Mosley and Hulme, 1996). The gain in terms of making possible 
access to credit for borrowers without collateral, in contexts where social 
sanctions are insufficient, could exceed the potential loss due to crowding 
out of other poor potential borrowers. 
We motivate repossession among group members in joint liability 
agreements from the observation that, unlike individual lending contracts, 
group members can affect each others' payoffs. For example, if an individual 
chooses not to contribute her share of a group loan, then she may adversely 
affect her partner's payoff. The loss faced by an individual who contributes 
when her partner does not is  r   if she chooses to repay the group loan 
herself, and  pθ − r   if she decides to default. 
In either case, assuming that  pθ ≥ r  , she is worse off than she would 
have been if her partner had contributed her share. It is the fact that she 
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suffers this loss that may lead a borrower to expropriate her partner if the 
latter does not pay her share. In terms of the repossession of assets, we only 
allow for the expropriation of those investments in the project associated for 
the group loan. In particular, the share of investment financed with personal 
contributions can potentially be seized by other members of the group. 
The repossession penalty function, denoted by  R⋅   depends on the loss 
inflicted by the noncontributing member on her partner, and also upon the 
profitability of the project associated with the defaulting loan. The latter says 
that if a noncontributor has a relatively unprofitable project, then the 
expropriation penalty is smaller. Define the loss for a member with project 
return  θ   of the group when the other has decided not to contribute as  
Lθ, r = minpθ − r, r.   
Let the repossession function be given by  R Lθ,r,θ
′
= μλL,θ ′ ,  
with  
∂λ
∂L > 0   and  
∂λ
∂θ′
> 0
 , where  μ   is the personal contribution of the 
group member to her individual investment project financed with the group 
loan and  λL,θ ′    is the fraction of that contribution that would be 
repossessed by the other group member in the event of default by that group 
member. We now characterize the project return vectors  θ1 ,θ2    for 
which there is group loan repayment, when there is collateral and 
repossession is possible. 
Proposition 2: As before if  θ i > φ2r   for either  1=i   or 2, there is  repayment. If  
φr < θ i ≤ φ2r    for both  1=i   and 2, the loan may be repaid. If  
φr < θ i ≤ φ2r   for one group member  i   but  θ j ≤ φr   for the other 
member  j  , then there  is repayment if  pθ j + Rpθ i  − r,θJ  > r   Otherwise, 
there will be group default.     
Proof: See appendix.     
The repayment rate may be higher as individuals with unprofitable projects 
but with collateral will not default in order to avoid loss of investment. In 
particular, without collateral a situation in which borrower 1 is individually 
solvent but not enough to cover the whole group loan,  
φr < θ1 ≤ φ2r,   while the other group member has a lower project 
return  θ2 ≤ φr  , would lead to group default. But, in the case in which 
borrower 2 has collateral, there may be repayment as long as the 
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repossession costs exceed the gain from default  
Rpθ1  − r,θ2  > r − pθ2 .   Hence, the negative spillovers from 
unprofitable projects are mitigated as group members with profitable 
projects and lenders can avoid the losses due to group default. At the same 
time, collateral can enhance the prospects of group members with collateral 
to obtain insurance under joint liability (i.e. whole group loan repayment by 
borrower 1, if  θ2 ≤ φr   but  θ1 > φ2r   as the willingness of other 
borrowers to form a group with them as members rises. 
Now we establish that given enough collateral availability, the possibility of 
asset repossession among group members can guarantee higher repayment 
under joint than individual liability. This would mean that the mutual 
insurance effect of group lending would dominate the negative spillover 
effect. 
 Proposition 3: If mutual insurance is possible in group lending (i.e.,  φ2r < θ ,  the 
repayment under group lending exceeds  that under individual lending given sufficiently 
high group member personal  contribution  μ  .     
Proof: See appendix.     
Collateral is thus a mechanism for avoiding default under joint liability. To 
the extent that group default is not only harmful to the lender but also to 
group members losing access to future credit, personal investment 
contributions can enhance group formation under joint liability. In the 
present context, without social sanctions, unless collateral is sufficiently high, 
we cannot be certain that group lending will deliver higher repayment rates 
than individual lending. 
There is a financial institution related to group lending under collateral, 
which also involves joint liability, namely the use of cosigners. This refers to 
persons other than the main borrower who assume equal liability for 
repayment of the loan. Cosigners are effectively guarantors of the debt and 
to be acceptable to the lender need either enough collateral or reputation. In 
the same vein, when a low risk borrower forms a group with a high risk 
borrower, without recourse to social sanctions, it requires collateral to be 
provided. Also, when an borrower with collateral forms a group with a 
borrower without collateral, it requires that agent to invest in a low risk 
project. In group lending, borrowers are effectively each others cosigners. 
Normally for someone to agree to be somebody else's cosigner they tend to 
be very closely related, usually next of kin, presumably as in those 
circumstances the cosigner has private information about the borrower and 
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also can more easily enforce nonpecuniary penalties for default. However, in 
joint liability schemes, group formation among relatives is ruled out by 
design and in urban environments social sanctions are limited. Therefore 
group members are willing to be each other's cosigners if they perceive 
default sufficiently unlikely due to either sufficient partner's collateral or 
investment project safety. Hence, in developing country cities, group lending 
can enhance the risk sharing among households achieved with standard 
cosigner agreements by expanding this type of arrangement to be applied 
between households belonging to different communal organizations or 
kinship networks. 
  
 
4 Data and Survey Description 
 
We analyze the group lending program which was launched in Benin's largest 
city in October 2001 by GNO'NU and IFOLD (Istituto Formazione Lavoro 
Donne), both NGOs with seat in Cagliari in collaboration with Benin 
Interaction, a local NGO. Region Sardinia contributed 70% of the resources 
for the scheme and the remaining 30% was contributed by the above named 
organizations. The aim of the program was to provide financial services to 
poor women. While, the long term objectives were the reinforcement of 
women's participation in economic activity, and more generally, in society, as 
well as the improvement of health and educational conditions for them and 
their families. First, we provide an account of the program. Then, we 
describe the data. 
 
 
4.1 Group Lending in Cotonou 
 
The program was set up in the periphery of Cotonou, which is the largest 
city in Benin with 1.1 million inhabitants and also the main cluster of 
economic activities. The scheme followed the Grameen Bank model: a) 
clients are mainly women, often poor and vulnerable, who self-select each 
other to form solidarity groups, b) no collateral is required, c) loans are 
initially small but tend to increase after successful repayments, d) late 
repayment results in loss of future credit, and e) borrowers are required to 
contribute to a saving fund.  
The first contact with local people was through GNO'NU's local staff. They 
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were assigned to Godomey, in the periphery of Cotonou, to attract people's 
attention through a series of information meetings about the program. These 
were held in the main public squares of each neighborhood. When the first 
meetings were called, the staff explained the program's philosophy, rules and 
objective and potentially interested women were invited to attend the follow 
up meetings. They did not discriminate the participants in terms of wealth, 
relying on the consolidated belief that microcredit is not attractive to the 
better off. Then, women where selected by a first screening process based 
solely on possession of a valid national identification card. Then, after the 
self-selection in groups of three, women were screened by the verification of 
no family ties between members of the same group. 
The first 49 groups were served in 2001. The loan size was 20000 CFA, 
about $30 per member, that is roughly equivalent to the monthly wage of a 
well paid job in Cotonou at the time. The loan was payable over six months 
at the interest rate of 11.8%, of which 3% was earmarked for a saving fund. 3 
During the loan cycle, October 2001-April 2002, borrowers were provided 
training courses to manage their businesses. At the end of the sixth month, 
the repayment rate was 100% and in some cases loans were repaid in 
advance. This was the first loan cycle, with the second now in progress. 
When groups were already formed and working as a credit unit, GNO'NU's 
local staff asked to fill a questionnaire to have a better understating of  
beneficiaries' socio-economic characteristics and previous credit history. The 
survey consists of 147 women mainly vendors concentrated in the luxury 
sector (62%), where ''luxury'' is defined as the retail of nonessential items 
such as seasonings (17%), household services and specialty goods (e.g. 
confectionery and beauty care products) (45%). The rest of the women 
(38%) were in the basic sector, defined as the retail of necessity items, 
composed of staples (19%), fuel (9%) and vegetables (10%). We characterize 
vendors in the basic sector as deploying low risk projects relative to vendors 
of luxury items. This is because the demand for basic goods is income 
inelastic while the demand for nonessential items is relatively elastic. Hence, 
borrowers selling basic goods have safer returns in the face of cyclical 
income fluctuations relative to groups members selling luxury goods. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of financial resources other than group 
                                                 
3In 2001 the inflation rate was 3%, implying the real interest rate to be 5.8%. 
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lending, namely credit from other sources and personal contribution. In 
terms of sources of investment funds, credit from other sources was 
available to 12.2% and 94% declared to have invested some personal 
contribution to the investment project. The data set also contains 
information on group composition, education, place of residence and 
activity, marital status, husband activity, profits earned from previous project 
and number of children. Figure 2 shows that 46% of women lack any 
schooling attainment, 24% finished primary school and 26% finished 
secondary school. Also, 56% of women are diversified relative to their 
husband's activity. The latter is classified as either blue collar (i.e. unskilled 
workers) or white collar (i.e. professionals). Blue collar (e.g. fishermen, 
agricultural laborers) tend to be associated with more basic sectors relative to 
white collar (e.g. teachers, electricians). Hence, a household is diversified 
either if the woman is in the basic sector and her husband white collar or if 
the woman is in the luxury sector and her husband blue collar. Otherwise, 
the household is specialized. 
 
 
4.2 Variable Description and Methodology 
 
We constructed the variables of interest from GNO'NU's data file. The data 
file, firstly, specifies name, surname and group membership. Household 
composition information, including marital status, surname and profession 
of borrower's husband, number of children and place of residence is also 
available. Borrower's activity is reported by goods sold and workplace. Often 
women had two or more occupations at the same time, but we ordered their 
activity by first occupation. The financial variables are personal contribution 
to the investment, revenues earned from previous project, credit from other 
sources and the microcredit loan amount and terms. Descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. The 
dependent variable that we concentrate on is the personal contribution 
invested in the activity. The personal contribution devoted to the activity is 
deemed to perform the function of collateral. We use the TOBIT estimation 
procedure because data are available for the entire sample but the dependent 
variable exhibits censoring at the value of zero. In fact, we do not observe 
the personal contribution when is negative as we do not have information on 
debt. Personal contribution, PCON, is defined as a share of the total 
investment, defined as the sum of personal contribution, credit from other 
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sources and the micro-credit loan. In the same way, we construct COS, 
credit obtained from other sources and OLDREV, a measure of maximum 
profits earned by previous project due by revenues on the total investment. 
We cannot analyze repayment performance as there were no occurrences of 
group default precluding any variability that can be exploited empirically. 
The second group of variables describe sectors of activity. We initially 
distinguish between two main sectors: basic and luxury. With BAS, basic, we 
divide women selling staples, fuel and vegetables by women, in the luxury 
sector, selling seasonings, services and specialities goods. Then, we specify 
the composition of groups with respect to goods sold with GSTA, GFUE, 
GVEG, GSEA, GSER as the fraction of group members selling staples, fuel, 
vegetables, seasonings, and specialty goods respectively. 
The third group of variables are household characteristics. In developing 
countries, women's decisions are generally subordinated to men consensus. 
Hence, we may think the entrepreneurial initiatives to be subjected to the 
same regime, especially if both men and women operate in the same sector. 
Diversification of the family is captured by HDIV, household diversification, 
a dummy with value 1 if women selling basic goods are married to a husband 
with white collar activity (e.g. teachers and other professionals ) or selling 
luxury items are married to husband with blue collar occupations (e.g. 
fishermen and construction workers). Otherwise, HDIV is zero. Group 
members who want to prioritize minimization of insolvency probability and 
insure themselves, might take into account the entire family risk profile, 
rather than the marginal effect on the risk profile of this single project (e.g. 
Zeller, 1998). Evaluation on a potential partner might be, therefore, 
influenced by consumption, production and portfolio decisions. Goetz and 
Sen Gupta (1995) studies reveal loan accorded to women, if not destined to 
traditional women activities, to be invested in men of the family, husbands 
and sons, activities. Control over loans seems to be higher when borrowers 
are either widow or single (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1995). From this 
consideration, the idea of the variables S, single, CHIL, children, and ER, 
early repayment: dummies equal to 1 when the woman is single or widow 
and, if single or widow, when repays the loan early. Moreover, control over 
loans may be influenced by education, EDU, that may be a sort of positive 
spillover to the other women, especially illiterate (De Weerdt, 2001). We also 
want to study whether personal contribution may mitigate asymmetric 
information problems. 
From the data set, we know that numerous women work and/or live in the 
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same neighborhood as other members of the group and we think forms of 
monitoring may intervene, in such a way to substitute personal contribution. 
Figure 3 illustrates IWOR and IRES, which are two dummies with value 1 if 
a particular borrower respectively either works or lives in the same place as 
another member of the group. We have that 77% of women share workplace 
with a peer borrower and 79% share residence with a peer borrower. 
GWOR  and GRES indicate the proportion of women of a group 
working/living in the same place. Thus, they are 1 when all work/live in the 
same place, 0 if all work/live in different places, 1/3 and 2/3 if 1 or 2 
work/live in the same place. Figure 4 shows high prevalence of daily 
interaction as groups with members working or living in the same place are 
common. Then, to investigate how the selection process takes place, we 
explore the group formation process with respect to risk: homogeneous 
versus heterogeneous group formation. GBAS is the fraction of group 
members in the basic sector and takes the values of 1, 1/3 and 2/3 when all, 
one or two members are in the basic sector. On the other hand, group 
diversification is expressed by GDIV, which takes the value of 1 when 
GBAS is either 1/3 or 2/3, and the value of 0 otherwise. Figure 5 shows that 
80% of groups are diversified with a mix of safe and risky borrowers. Of the 
20% specialized groups, 15% concentrate in basic goods. 
Furthermore, to characterize the nature of group formation when the group 
is heterogenous, we highlight the odd one out operating in either the basic or 
the luxury sector with OOOB and OOOL. What we want to study is 
whether operating either in the safe basic sector or in the luxury risky sector 
involves considerations regarding insurance provision from the risky 
borrower to the safe borrowers in order for the risky to be accepted into the 
group. In particular, OOOB = 1 if BAS = 1 and GBAS = 1/3 and OOOL = 
1 if BAS = 0 and GBAS = 2/3. Among odd one out borrowers (i.e. those 
who make the group heterogenous), 19% sell basic goods and 7% luxury 
goods. Finally, to draw the profile of the odd one out we consider the 
possibility she is married to a white collar professional. MOB and MOL are 
obtained by MARWHI  ⋅   OOOB and MARWHI  ⋅   OOOL respectively, 
where MARWHI is a variable describing borrowers married with a white 
collar professional. Then, we consider the case of an odd one out belonging 
to a diversified family: HC1 = (1- HDIV) ⋅  OOOB and to a specialized 
family: HC2= HDIV ⋅  OOOL. These variables tell us whether borrowers 
contributing insurance to the group originate from diversified households. 
 20 
The scope and needs for household consumption smoothing affect the 
possibilities for borrowers to achieve risk sharing through group lending. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
In the first regression, we use a LOGIT specification to explore how 
borrower and household characteristics determine the choice of a risky 
project. The dependent variable is LUX= (1-BAS) and the independent 
variables we included are: HDIV, COS, OLDREV and the control variables: 
EDU, S and CHIL. The results in Table 2 show that more credit from other 
sources, household diversification and high sales from previous project are 
associated with the selection to enter the luxury sector. It seems that to the 
extent that a borrower is less liquidity constrained and more able to smooth 
household consumption, risky projects are more attractive. Since the less 
constrained borrowers choose riskier projects, we infer that the expected 
return in the luxury sector is higher, and also that there is may some scope 
for insurance within groups.  
Throughout our regression analysis we have as dependant variable the 
fraction of total investment which is financed with personal contribution of 
the group member. We use this variable to measure the collateral represented 
by the assets that the group member has personally contributed to her 
investment project. We control for both household and project 
characteristics. In the first set of regressions, we include variables 
characterizing the risk structure of both the household and the group. The 
first interesting outcome is that credit from other sources is an imperfect 
substitute of personal contribution: the coefficient of COS is negative, highly 
significant and in most specifications it is close to 2/3. The fact that the 
estimated coefficient is negative suggests that personal contributions and 
credit from other sources are indeed substitutes. But the fact that the 
absolute value of the estimated coefficient is less than one suggests that 
credit from other sources is an imperfect substitute for personal 
contributions. Such a result is, to some extent, not surprising. First, credit 
from other sources may only be available on dear terms. Second, having 
loans with other creditors might induce borrowers, in moments of financial 
difficulties, not to reimburse the microcredit first. This result turns out to be 
robust throughout all of our specifications. 
From Table 3, women in diversified households tend to put personal 
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contributions roughly 7% higher. This may be due to two separate effects. 
First, diversified household may be less able to provide insurance to other 
group members under the joint liability agreement because if their project is 
profitable but their husband's income suffers a negative shock, they are more 
likely to bailout the household before they bail out other group members. 
Hence, household diversification deters the borrower from engaging in 
mutual insurance. This effect may be mitigated by providing a higher 
personal contribution for collateral purposes. Second, another possible 
reason for higher personal contributions is that diversified households may 
be in a better position to engage in larger investments. Therefore, group 
members from such households are more likely to have to resort to personal 
contributions as microcredit and credit from other sources are limited. 
Also, the fraction of women within the group working or living in the same 
place is associated with lower personal contributions by 21% and 19% 
respectively. Having an additional group member sharing location is 
correlated with a reduction of about 6% in the personal contribution. 
Working in the same place can be associated to the capacity of being able to 
monitor effort and living in the same place may be translated into a superior 
knowledge about group members types. Hence by mitigating moral hazard 
and adverse selection, when more group members work and live in the same 
place, there is a reduction in the need for collateral. Table 3 includes two 
other group characteristics. The higher share of group members with 
projects in the basic sector, the lower personal contributions. One more 
group member who is a vendor of necessity items is associated with a drop 
of 5% in the share of personal contributions. Because, essential items are 
always in demand, they are not subject to decline on the face of cyclical 
fluctuations. Hence, more women in group working in the basic goods 
sector, means more low risk group members. Now, we characterize group 
heterogeneity by denominating the group as diversified if it has both low risk 
members (project in basic sector) and high risk members (project in luxury 
sector). The latter are low risk because the income elasticity of the products 
they supply is much higher. In diversified groups, the share of investments 
financed with personal contributions is 13% higher according. 
In Table 4, we introduce two additional variables which give information 
about the group member's position within the group. One is dummy variable 
which is 1 if the woman works in the same place as some other group 
member and the second tells us whether the woman lives in the same 
building as another woman in the group. These variables are not highly 
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significant when we do not include the group indicator about the fraction of 
women sharing workplace or living quarters. When we include the latter, we 
find that conditional upon sharing location, being one of the women in the 
group in such situation is associated with a higher contribution. This higher 
collateral may compensate for risk from operating in the same local market, 
which limits the scope for risk diversification within the group. The effects a 
large share of low risk members and of group heterogeneity remain robust 
both in significance and magnitude. Having more basic good projects in the 
group leads to less need for collateral while heterogenous risk groups are 
associated with higher personal contributions. 
Whether the project is in the basic or luxury sector is also not informative 
until we incorporate variables controlling for the individual's impact on 
group heterogeneity. The dummy variable indicating that the investment is in 
a project to supply basic goods is insignificant in the first and second group 
of regressions, that is when we do not specify the type of odd one out in the 
group. These results suggest the presence of other elements determining 
group formation. However, in Table 2 we show that when we run the 
LOGIT regressions we know the choice to operate into the luxury sector to 
be influenced by belonging to a diversified households and having more 
credit from other sources compared to a women entering in the basic sector. 
As far as individual and household characteristics are concerned, what 
matters is household diversification. A higher personal contribution, when 
women belongs to diversified families, may be interpreted as a minor 
capacity of selling insurance to high risk members. In fact, if the husband's 
activity goes bad, it is plausible suppose the woman will divert the credit to 
the family. Thus, in order to be accepted by the group the personal 
contribution has to be 6 to 8 % higher. More precisely, women in the volatile 
sector from diversified households need to provide less collateral. Blue collar 
husband lowers probability of group loan default, whereas women in low 
risk sector in diversified households need to provide more collateral. White 
collar husband hampers insurance to the group. Regarding project 
characteristics, having obtained high returns may be a signal of goodness of 
the activity and hence requires less personal contribution. Moreover, being 
the odd one out of the luxury sector implies more collateral in order to be 
accepted in the group. In other words, high risk members buy insurance 
from low risk members. On the other hand, being the odd one out in the 
basic sector lowers the probability of group default. Then, low risk group 
members when the other members are both high risk, face a lower personal 
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contribution requirement. Agents without collateral but willing to play this 
insurance role in the group may be able to access credit. 
In Table 5, we incorporate two sets of new variables. One tells us whether 
the woman who makes the group heterogenous, which we label odd one out 
(OOO henceforth) is in the basic or luxury sector. If she is in the basic 
sector, her role is basically that of providing insurance to the group. In this 
case, the associated drop in the personal contribution is between 25 and 
28%. If she is in the luxury sector, other things equal, she may raise the risk 
profile of the group and is receiving insurance. Our findings indicate a 
tendency for the contribution of OOO risky borrowers to be higher. 
Furthermore, we find that OOO group members in the luxury sector only 
have to put more collateral when they are in diversified households. When 
they are in specialized households, odd one out members in luxury sector 
actually contribute do not have to contribute additional collateral. This is 
because originating in a undiversified household actually mitigates incentives 
for strategic default when the risky project performs well. Then, there is no 
need to divert resources from the group to the family to compensate for 
negative shocks in their husband's income. This solves the main problem 
posed by risky borrowers which is not that they require insurance when 
projects fail but rather that bailouts may be caused by strategic behavior. In 
contrast, when OOO borrowers are low risk, their need to provide collateral 
is lessened by household diversification. In this case, what matters is the 
ability of the borrower to provide insurance in bad states of the world, which 
is facilitated by household diversification rather than specialization. 
Finally, Table 6 introduces an independent variable measuring sales to 
investment ratio from the last project of the group member. This variable 
captures both the borrowers track record as an investor and availability of 
funds for collateral. The results indicate that the former effect is more 
important as higher revenue in the past is associated with less need for 
collateral in the present. When we control with this past performance 
measure, some of the group variables become insignificant. In particular, 
common work place and residential location are not associated with personal 
contributions in any systematic way. However, the risk profile of the group 
has an impact which is consistent . As before, more safe borrowers induce 
lower collateral and group heterogeneity leads to higher collateral 
requirements for risky borrowers. 
The lack of need for collateral complete for borrowers from specialized 
households. In the presence of this variable the most important effect, in 
 24 
terms of the group's risk structure affecting collateral, is that the OOO from 
the luxury sector group member from a specialized household contributes 
30% less of her own resources to the overall investment, completely 
offsetting the need for higher personal contribution arising from her 
inducement of group heterogeneity. Hence, as long as they are not impeded 
household consumption smoothing demands, even risky borrowers making 
the group heterogenous do not  hamper intra-group insurance through 
strategic default. Addressing the issue of homogeneous groups versus 
heterogeneous groups, belonging to a low risk group, in the sense that a 
higher fraction of group members has projects in basic good provision, 
means less probability for joint liability to generate group default. This 
outcome is costly to all group members in the sense that access to 
microcredit is lost. In order to avoid group default, some group members 
may decide to bailout others. Having to make such a contribution increases 
financing costs. Hence, other things equal, individuals avoid situations in 
which they expect the prospect that they have to bailout the group. In 
particular, the probability of bailout is minimized the more homogenous the 
group is because conditional upon success an individual's project, the 
probability that the other members of the group failed is at its lowest. 
However, from the point of view of the lender, this implies that groups are 
specialized and there is no risk pooling in group formation. This may raise 
the likelihood of collusion. In a group that diversifies risk, collateral mitigates 
bailout prospects. The more diversified is the group, the higher personal 
contributions to investment are to offset bailout prospects. Collateral is 
indeed a catalyst for risk sharing beneficial both to the jointly liable group 
and to the lender. The evidence is very robust that collateral is a vehicle to 
mitigate moral hazard, due to strategic default, which in turn facilitates risk 
sharing. While borrowers with risky projects but with good track records can 
avoid higher collateral due to working or living elsewhere relative to peers, 
they cannot avoid higher collateral due to the higher probability of bailouts 
by safe borrowers associated with risk pooling. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In the model, we show that collateral is a mechanism for avoiding default 
under joint liability. To the extent that group default is not only harmful to 
the lender but also to group members losing access to future credit, personal 
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investment contributions can enhance group formation under joint liability. 
In the present context, without social sanctions, unless collateral is 
sufficiently high, we cannot be certain that group lending will deliver higher 
repayment rates than individual lending. Hence, the negative spillovers from 
unprofitable projects are mitigated as group members with profitable 
projects and lenders can avoid the losses due to group default. At the same 
time, collateral can enhance the prospects of group members without 
collateral to access credit under joint liability as the willingness of other 
borrowers to form a group with them rises when they provide insurance by 
self-selecting into the safe basic sector. 
Our empirical results show that heterogenous groups emerge in which 
members with high risk investment projects mitigate default prospects 
through collateral. This shows that joint liability is conducive to insurance 
provision as long as there is a mechanism for high risk investors in the group 
to compensate low risk investor members. In the past, it has been suggested 
that transfers or side payments could sustain heterogenous groups in what 
effectively amounts to high risk members purchasing insurance from low 
risk ones. However, there is no evidence provided that such transfers take 
place. Yet, the evidence of intra-group insurance would seem consistent with 
the notion that patient borrowers will avoid strategic default as loss of future 
credit is very costly. 
We establish that personal contributions to investment projects play the 
same role as collateral in that low risk group members are willing to join 
liability agreements with high risk group members who provide substantial 
personal contributions. While generally group members in the basic sector 
are able to join without providing collateral, as they provide insurance. 
Members in the luxury sector also seem to be able to provide insurance as 
long as they come from specialized households. This is because when they 
come from diversified households, and they do well, they first have to help 
at home before they can commit profits to bail out other group members 
out. 
In general, collateral in the form of personal contribution to the investment 
project, mitigates risk in group formation. In our empirical analysis, we find 
that when borrowers live or work together, when they come from 
undiversified households, when they are low risk and in homogenous 
groups, ans when they have good track records, then the need for collateral 
is lessened. There is a synergy between low and high risk group members in 
that, in the absence of social capital, borrowers without collateral would not 
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have access to credit. At the same time, those borrowers by specializing in 
low risk activities provide insurance to borrowers with collateral who would 
obtain credit in any case but otherwise would lack access to insurance against 
default. This finding about the benefits of group lending when agents with 
different collateral possibilities interact is consistent with the finding by 
Ahlin and Townsend (2002). They report evidence from microcredit 
programs in Thailand that in more prosperous regions, intra-village wealth 
heterogeneity is associated with more intensive use of group lending and that 
there is a U-shaped relationship between group borrowing and household 
wealth. The common concern that when the poorest are not the recipient of 
microcredit there is a welfare loss may not be operational in this contexts. 
Crowding in of poor borrowers rather than crowding out may operate in 
urban environments, and other settings in which heterogeneous households 
interact, in which the level of social capital common in rural village 
communities is unlikely to materialize and provide sufficient information 
access and strong enough sanctions to sustain group lending without 
collateral. 
In developing countries, where a large share of households live perilously 
close to subsistence thresholds, household earnings risk can have a 
particularly substantial impact on welfare. Mechanisms for risk sharing 
across households are of paramount importance. Attanasio and Davis (1996) 
have shown that even in the US, where contingent security markets are far 
more advanced than in any developing country, the joint distribution of 
household earnings and consumption observed in cross sectional data is 
inconsistent with the complete insurance against earnings risk availablein the 
Arrow-Debreu setting. Hence, when insurance markets are missing and 
household consumption smoothing via self-insurance is scarcely feasible, the 
introduction mechanisms to further risk sharing is crucial. Group lending 
schemes, mostly used in rural communities, when deployed in urban areas - 
or other situations in which agents with and without collateral interact - 
could facilitate risk sharing between households. 
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Appendix 
 
The specification of the game and subsequent proofs follow Besley and 
Coate (1995) but rather than using social sanctions to punish strategic default 
by borrowers, group members resort to asset repossession as specified in the 
set up of the model above. The repayment game has two stages. At the first 
stage, borrowers decide whether to contribute  c   or not to contribute  
n   their share of the outstanding loan payment due,  r  . At the second 
stage, conditional on the decisions taken by both borrowers at the first stage, 
each chooses either to pay,  P  , or default  D. The Game leads to seven 
Cases of Subgame Perfect Equilibria. 
Case1: If  θ i ≥ φ2r,    i = 1, 2,   then there are three sub-cases: 
(a) If  Rr,θ i    >    r   for  i = 1, 2,   then  c, Pc,P   is an 
equilibrium 
(b) If  Rr,θ1    >    r   , then  n, c,P   is an equilibrium 
(c) If  Rr,θ2    >    r   , then  c, P, n   is an equilibrium 
Case 2: If  θ1    > φ2r   and  θ2    < φ2r  , then there are two sub-cases: 
(a) If  Rr,θ2    < r  , then  c, P, n   is an equilibrium 
(b) If  Rr,θ2 > r  , then  c, D, c,P   is an equilibrium 
Case 3: If  θ2    > φ2r   and  θ1    < φ2r  . This is symmetric to Case 2. 
Case 4: If  θ i ∈ φr,φ2r  , i=1,2, then  c,D, c,D   and  n, n   
are both equilibria 
Case 5: If  θ i    < φr  , i=1,2, then  n, n   is the only equilibrium 
Case 6: If  θ1 ∈ φr,φ2r   and  θ2 < φr  , then there are two 
subcases: 
(a) If  pθ2  + Rpθ1  − r,θ2  > r  , then  c,D, c,D   is an 
equilibrium 
(b) If  pθ2  + Rpθ1  − r,θ2  < r  , then  n, n   is an equilibrium 
Case 7: If  θ1 < φr   and  θ2 ∈ φr,φ2r  . This is symmetric to 
Case 6. 
Proof of Proposition 1: If at least one borrower has a return bigger than  φ2r  
, we are in either Case 1, 2 or 3. In either Case the loan is repaid. If both 
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borrowers have returns between  φr   and  φ2r  , we are in Case 4 and 
since  c,D, c,D   is an equilibrium the bank's loan may be repaid. In 
the remaining Cases ( 5, 6 and 7), the bank's loan will not be repaid if  
R⋅ = 0  .   
Proof of Proposition 2: The only difference from this and Proposition 1, is the 
case when one borrower receives a return  θ ′   between  φr   and  φ2r   
and the other borrower receives a return  φ   smaller than  φr   but such 
that  pθ + Rpθ ′  − r,θ > r  . This corresponds to Cases 6(a) and 7(a). 
In both cases  c,D, c,D   is an equilibrium and hence the bank loan 
may be repaid.   
Proof of Proposition 3: For all  μ > 0  , define the function  
θμ : φr,φ2r → θ ,φr   implicitly from the equation  
pθμθ ′  + μλpθ ′  − r,θμθ ′ = r  . For social sanctions of strength  
μ  , it should be clear that if one borrower has a return  θ ′ ∈ φr,φ2r   
and the other has a return  θ < φr  , then repayment will occur if and only 
if  θ > θμθ
′ .   The probability of the latter event is  
Fφr − Fθμθ ′   . It follows that we my write the repayment rate 
under group lending as 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] )()(222(1, 2 θθθφφφφµ µφφ ′′−+−−≡Π ∫ dFFrFrFrFrFr rrG
 
 
The last term represents the probability that one borrower has a return 
between  φr   and  φ2r  , and the other has a return lower than  φr  , 
but sufficient high for repayment to occur, while the rest corresponds exactly 
to the RHS of (2) above. 
Substracting (1) from (5) yields, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ] )()(21, 2 θθθφφµ µφφ ′′−−≡Π−Π ∫ dFFrFrFrr rrIG  
 
The first term in this expression, that favors group lending, is positive. The 
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second, that favors individual lending, is negative. But, as  μ   gets large this 
second term goes to zero. To see this, note first that for all  
θ ′ ∈ φr,φ2r, limμ→∞ θμθ ′  = θ  ; that is, as social sanctions get 
increasingly severe the critical project return necessary to induce repayment 
gets nearer and nearer to the minimal return. This follows from part (iii) of 
Assumption 1. Since F is continuous, it follows that for  
θ ′ ∈ φr,φ2r, limμ→∞ Fθμθ ′  = Fθ   . Moreover, since  F   is a 
distribution function, the sequence of functions  
〈Fθμθ ′ 〉μ=1
∞
 is 
bounded. Thus we may conclude from the Bounded Convergence Theorem 
that  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0)()()()(lim)()(lim 222 =′=′′=′′ ∫∫∫ ∞→∞→ θθθθθθθθ φφµµφφµφφµ dFFdFFdFF rrrrrr
  .   
  
 33 
Figure 1. Financing Structure 
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Figure 2- Borrower Characteristics 
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Figure 3 – Borrower’s Relationship to Other Group Members 
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Figure 4 – Group Members’ Daily Interaction 
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Figure 5 – Group’s Risk Heterogeneity 
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Figure 6 – Activity of Borrower inducing Group Heterogeneity 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statitistics 
 
Variables Definition Average Std. dev. Obs 
PCON Personal contribution to the activity 0.534 0.253 147 
COS Credit from other sources 0.065 0.188 147 
BAS =1 if in the Basic sector 0.380 0.487 147 
GSTA Members of the group selling staples 0.217 0.219 147 
GFUE Members of the group selling fuel 0.088 0.147 147 
GVEG Members of the group selling vegetables 0.065 0.133 147 
GSEA Fraction of the group selling seasonings 0.176 0.225 147 
GSER Fraction of the group providing services or 
selling specialities 
0.442 0.207 147 
OLDREV Revenue earned from previous activity 0.039 0.056 131 
HDIV Household diversification 0.462 0.5 147 
MARWHI =1 if Married with a “white collar” 0.251 0.435 147 
S =1 if Single 0.149 0.357 147 
ER =1 if Early repayment 0.054 0.227 147 
EDU Education 3.857 3.839 147 
CHIL Number of children 3.149 2.124 147 
GWOR Fraction of the group working in the same 
place 
0.469 0.233 49 
GRES Fraction of the group living in the same 
place 
0.453 0.202 49 
IWOR =1 A borrower works in the same place as 
someone else in the group 
0.231 0.423 147 
IRES = A borrower lives in the same place as 
someone else in the group 
0.210 0.409 147 
GBAS Fraction of the group in the Basic sector 0.378 0.222 49 
GDIV Group diversification 0.795 0.404 49 
OOO =1 if Odd one out 0.265 0.443 147 
OOOB =1 if Odd one out in the Basic sector 0.190 0.394 147 
OOOL =1 if Odd one out in the Luxury sector 0.068 0.252 147 
MOB =1 when Odd one out in the Basic sector 
and married with a “white collar” 
0.047 0.213 147 
MOL =1 when Odd one out in the Luxury sector 
and married with a “white collar” 
0.013 0.116 147 
HC1 =1 when Odd one out belonging to a 
diversified household 
0.170 0.376 147 
HC2 =1 when Odd one out belonging to a 
specialized household 
0.142 0.351 147 
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Table 2 – Project Risk 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables Luxury item vending 
project Dummy 
COS 1.311* 1.653* 
 (1.095) (1.118) 
   
HDIV 1.103*** 1.088* 
 (0.388) (0.396) 
   
OLDREV 1.314** 1.138*** 
 (3.392) (3.518) 
   
Control household 
characteristics 
NO YES 
Number of Obs. 131 131 
Pseudo R2 0.0558 0.0674 
 
 
 41 
Table 3 – Collateral and Group Characteristics 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables PCON 
COS  -0.638***  -0.621***  -0.623*** -0.594*** -0.582*** -0.585*** 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
       
HDIV 0.084** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.069** 0.071** 0.068** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
       
IWOR       
       
       
IRES       
       
       
GWOR    -0.208*** -0.199*** -0.201*** 
    (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
       
GRES    -0.190*** -0.188*** -0.189*** 
    (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
       
GBAS -0.160** -0.159* -0.154* -0.211*** -0.208** -0.196*** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.095) (0.087) (0.086) (0.094) 
       
GDIV 0.130*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.125*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
       
Control 
household 
characteristics 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control 
project 
characteristics 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of 
Obs 
147 147 147 147 147 147 
Pseudo R2 0.8662 0.8973 0.8977 1.0416 1.0620 1.0639 
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Table 4 – Collateral and Borrowers Relation to the Group 
 
 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables PCON 
COS   -0.621***   -0.607***   -0.609*** -0.582*** -0.568*** -0.572*** 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
       
HDIV 0.073** 0.078*** 0.074** 0.072** 0.074*** 0.071** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
       
IWOR -0.074* -0.069* -0.069* 0.052 0.049 0.049* 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
       
IRES -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 0.117* 0.124* 0.124* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
       
GWOR    -0.288* -0.271* -0.273* 
    (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) 
       
GRES    -0.380*** -0.389*** -0.391*** 
    (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
       
GBAS -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.176** -0.214*** -0.211*** -0.197*** 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.096) (0.086) (0.086) (0.094) 
       
GDIV 0.135*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
           
Control 
household 
characteristics 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control project 
characteristics 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Obs 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Pseudo R2 0.9170 0.9419 0.9426 1.1033 1.1291 1.1315 
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Table 5 – Collateral and Group Risk Heterogeneity 
 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables PCON 
COS -0.609*** -0.614*** -0.657*** -0.625*** -0.623*** -0.621*** 
 (0.096) (0.099) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) 
       
HDIV 0.072** 0.064* 0.073** 0.073** 0.082** 0.086*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
       
IWOR 0.015 -0.009 -0.027    
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.090)    
       
IRES 0.115* 0.107* 0.127**    
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.070)    
       
GWOR -0.216 -0.162 -0.111 -0.194*** -0.182*** -0.152** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.167) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) 
       
GRES -0.379*** -0.363*** -0.294*** -0.195*** -0.190*** -0.154* 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.145) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) 
       
GBAS -0.227*** -0.244*** -0.646*** -0.226*** -0.229*** -0.449*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.250) (0.093) (0.092) (0.154) 
       
GDIV 0.135*** 0.146*** 0.198*** 0.129*** 0.138*** 0.178*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.056) (0.048) (0.049) (0.053) 
       
OOOB -0.018 -0.026 0.283** -0.009 -0.097 -0.256** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.155) (0.055) (0.121) (0.149) 
       
OOOL 0.040 0.059 0.120 0.054 0.051 0.152* 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.109) (0.086) (0.087) (0.104) 
       
MOL -0.175 -0.177 -0.253* -0.193 -0.276* -0.290* 
 (0.173) (0.171) (0.194) (0.174) (0.197) (0.195) 
       
MOB -0.185 -0.151 0.021 -0.200** -0.120 -0.084 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.145) (0.101) (0.134) (0.134) 
       
Control household 
characteristics 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control project 
characteristics 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Obs 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Pseudo R2 1.2287 1.4479 1.5468 1.1781 1.2084 1.2670 
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Table 6 – Collateral, Heterogeneity and Member’s Group Position 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables PCON 
COS -0.653*** -0.641*** -0.642*** -0.609*** -0.598*** -0.604*** 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) 
       
HDIV 0.076** 0.076** 0.091*** 0.072** 0.072** 0.087*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
       
IWOR -0.075* -0.070* -0.054 0.015 0.014 0.002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) 
       
IRES -0.020 0.017 0.003 0.115* 0.121* 0.133** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) 
       
GWOR    -0.216 -0.203 -0.150 
    (0.171) (0.170) (0.170) 
       
GRES    -0.379*** -0.386*** -0.365*** 
    (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) 
       
GBAS -0.212*** -0.215*** -0.499*** -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.457*** 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.155) (0.092) (0.092) (0.153) 
       
GDIV 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.202*** 0.135*** 0.142*** 0.187*** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) 
       
OOOB -0.008 -0.119** -0.309*** -0.018 -0.217 -0.291** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.151) (0.055) (0.055) (0.149) 
       
OOOL 0.067* 0.078 0.189** 0.040 0.051* 0.138 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.103) (0.086) (0.086) (0.103) 
       
MOL -0.179 -0.187 -0.284* -0.175 -0.184 -0.288* 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.197) (0.173) (0.172) (0.193) 
       
MOB -0.216*** -0.205*** -0.077 -0.185** -0.175** 0.053 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.136) (0.102) (0.102) (0.134) 
       
Control for 
household 
characteristics 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control for 
project 
characteristics 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of 
Obs 
147      
Pseudo R2 1.0658 1.0877 1.1968 1.2287 1.2523 1.3334 
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Table 7 – Collateral, Heterogeneity and Borrower Track Record  
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables 
PCON 
COS -0.739*** -0.730*** -0.730*** -0.715*** -0.705*** -0.730*** 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) 
       
HDIV 0.032 0.032 0.047 0.028 0.029 0.050* 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) 
       
IWOR -0.100 -0.103 -0.110* -0.074 -0.079 -0.094* 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
       
IRES 0.024 0.027 0.039 0.038 0.042 0.050 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
       
GWOR 0.034 0.044 0.077 -0.010 0.002 0.050 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) 
       
GRES -0.130 -0.135 -0.126 -0.126 -0.141 -0.128 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.130) (0.129) 
       
GBAS -0.197*** -0.192*** -0.365*** -0.210*** -0.204*** -0.383*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.130) (0.084) (0.084) (0.131) 
       
GDIV 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.132*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.150*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) 
       
OOOB -0.047 -0.046 -0.156 -0.005 0.005 -0.156* 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.124) (0.041) (0.041) (0.091) 
       
OOOL 0.039 0.043 0.108 -0.007 -0.004 0.057 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.084) (0.064) (0.064) (0.083) 
       
MOL -0.251** -0.254** -0.329***    
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.155)    
       
MOB -0.155** -0.149 -0.056    
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.112)    
       
OLDREV -1.935*** -1.896*** -1.855*** -1.907*** -1.860*** -1.823*** 
 (0.338) (0.342) (0.334) (0.341) (0.345) (0.338) 
       
Control household 
characteristics 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control project 
characteristics 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of Obs 147 147 147 147 147  
Pseudo R2 4.0518 4.0661 4.2016 3.7988 3.8181  
 
 
